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612 REVIEWS 
ff. N. CASTANEDA, Oblitation and modal logic. LoAU et Mllly1e, n.s. vol. 3 (1960), 
pp. 40-48. 
Deontic lop:, it is argued, cannot be adequately rormalized as a more part or, or reduced to 
a system of, ordinuy modal logic. Anderson's conditions for a normal deontic losic (see 
reference in preceding review) are viewed as not sufficient to insure that 'P', 'O', and •p• when 
interpreted will have the intended correspondence to the meanings or• permissible,' 'obliptory,' 
and ' forbidden.' A counter-example is given to show that some restriction upon the interpre-
tation of the propositional constant• B • is required. Otherwise, from 'There is a blue book which 
may have failed to be blue• it is possible by the definitions and interpretations or• S • and • p• 
to conclude 'It is forbidden that there is a blue book.• 
Three possible interpretations or •s•, declared to be the only ones that will do, arc consi-
dered: and grounds for rejecting each, presented. Not considered, however, Is the Interpretation 
of • S • as • There is·a violation,' an alternative that does not seem objectionable in the manner of 
the rejected three. 
A more persuasive case is made against deontic systems in which "COpLOp' is provable (thole 
based upon S4 or stron1er systems). That true statements formulatina obliptions are all loak:ally 
true is viewed by the author as absurd. 
It is ar,ued that the 'D(•p:, S):, Op' part, i.e., 'Pp:, ◊(p & •S)', of Anderson's 
• OM7. Op • 0( - p :> S) • is false in the deonti<; interpretation proposed, but then what 
purporU to be a counter-example or 'O(p & •S):, Pp' is presented. The proposed counter-
example errs in interpretin1 •s• as a sinale particular sanction, rather than u Anderson's dis-
junction or all sanctions. 
Anderson's deontie S)'$lems arc characd with committing Mooro's "naturalistic fallacy" iD 
tho sense or confusina aoodness with a non-ethical property, aood in the teDJe of ouaht (to 
exist). 
Finally, It is allepd to be error to prefix deontic operators to descriptions of states or affain; 
but aside from merely asserting lhat lhese must be prefixed to descriptions of acts, no reasons 
are pvcn wby the Anderson approach is unacceptable. 
The Issues raised about (I) restrictions upon the interpretation of' B • and (2) the provability 
or 'COpLOp' seem to the reviewer to require either some further Ollplanation or some rcfioo. 
ment or the proposed deontlc systems or their interpretation. 
Misprint: pap 44, line 38, for •p:, S', read '•P:, S'. LAYMAN E. ALUM 
